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attendance at the out-patient clinics.
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patient clinics would show larger

cha~ges

in the direction

of increased risk taking between pre and post-program test- '
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numerically, indicating a greater willingness to take risks.
Change in the direction of increased risk taking was
found to be the major predictor of attendance at the out
patient c11nics.

Absolute willingness to risk, as measured

by the questionnaire was not found to be significantly dif
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Many psychotherapists feel that the capacity to risk
1s a necessary ingredient for change.

Whether that change

occur in a person seen in a professional context or 1n a
person who views new behavior as being more rewarding, risk
a~d

change go hand in hand.

Coleman (1972) described this

relationsh1p in.the following way_
Life often poses problems in which the pursuit of
increased satisfactions involves giving up present
hard-won security and taking new risks. For the
neurotic, this is likely to prove an especially
anxiety-arousing conflictful situation [p. 226].
Why

snould this be true?

It seems that one of the

major ways we keep ourselves from risking is by requiring
knowledge of what is' going to happen before we will try
something new.

I

I
,-

J

Polster and Polster (1972) state:

For most people the need to be able to predict the
results of their actions prevents them from easily
reaching beyond the existing forms of behavior where
the greatest opportunities are present. If they
venture into unfamiliar territory, while they might
gain an increased sense of excitement and power, .
they· .might lose their easy understanding and feel
unprepared and alien Cp. 1481.
Another force which makes risking, for change, a dif
ficult process is the fear of knowledge of oneself.

Part of

our energy is directed towards maintaining and protecting

:I

2

our self-esteem.
m~y un~ermine

We tend to be afraid of information that

our ideal image and use repressive defenses to

,-void coming in contact w1th what are perceived as unpleas
ant truths.
Maslow (1968) argues that there are two ways of deal

ing with the unknown.

One is to move toward knowledge and

increased understanding of oneself.

This 1s the growth pro

cessl by which one comes to know new aspects of himself and

can decide whether or not the behavior or characteristic is
positive.

Another way of dealing with the unknown is

clinging to safety and defensiveness.

by

Here the person hangs

on to the past, afraid to jeopardize what he already has,
thereby blindly supporting and defend1ng the old belief.
Maslow (1968) describes the prpces8 of healthy growth

as
• • • a never ending series of free choice situa
confronting each individual at every point
throughout his life, in which he must choose between
the delights of safety and growth (p. 47].
tions~

Each

or

the situations Maslow,refers to requires a

decision 1n which the adaptiveness of old 'behavior is
~elghed

against the risk of trying something new.

therapeutic context, trying

somethin~

learning ,and practicing new skills.
(1972) state:

In a

new (change) involves
Polstex' and Polster

. 3
A skill cannot be learned well until it is tried
out. By trying it out, the individual loweps his
t~reshold of risk.
In fact, the whole therapy scene
~s aimed at altering risk thresholQs through trying
out in relatively safe situations what i5 prohibi
tl'vely frightening in the world outside r p. 108l.
, Another aspect of therapy is developing awareness or
1nsight and here again we run into the need for risk taking.
Enright (1971) describes new awareness as almost always fol
lowing a sense of taking a chance:
• • • of groping to say the unsayable or beginning
something without being sure of the ending. When
th1s experience is not present, almost certainly the
"Insight" being pI"esented 'is a sterile rehash rather
than an expansion of awareness [p. 119).
Risk taking seems to be an important aspect of healthy
functioning and plays an integral part in changing maladap
tive behaviors.

Yet, even though these ideas are

gener~lly

accepted, the relationship between risk taking and healthy
functioning, or change to healthier functioning, has been
little tested empirically.
The focus of the present study is to investigate some
,of the relationships between' changes on an empirical measure
pf risk taking and subsequent behavioral ,changes.
Kogan-Walla~h

The

Choice Dilemmas Questionnai·re (l964) is used

as the empirleal

measur~

of risk and was given to hospltal

lzed alcoholics before and after an in-patient hosp1tal
treatment program.
~ttendance

As a measure of behavioral change"

at out-patient clinics was chosen because

4
co~t~nued

participation on an out-patient basis has been

. rela~:ed to reduced drinking and increased functioning in
I

. othe~ areas of the alcoholic's life (Gerard and Saenger

'1966),.

A detailed discussion of the· attributes and limita

tlons' of these variables will be presented later.
The remainder of the Introduction will

~e

devoted to

deflning risk taking and discussing the present state of the
art with reference to alcoholism.
Definition of Risk Taking
Researchers on risk taking do not look at the concept

of

ri~k

from quite the same perspective as do the above

cited therapist-s and theorists.
ably less romantic.
neceB~ary

Their thinking is remark

For some, the concept of risk was not a

factor in predicting decision-making behavior.

Edwards (1953), for example, proposed a group of
models,whlch postulated that a decision maker will choose
the alternative which will yield the maximum value for him.

The

declsio~

is based on a logical choice between the alter

nat1ves available.:

EmphaSis is placed

o~

the quality of the

alternatives and not on the characteristics of the Indivi
dual.

Therefore, if behavior can be pred1cted

1ndlvi~ual

~Y

ignoring

differences or situs·tional circumstances, the

concept of risk becomes irrelevant.

..

5
Experiments conducted by Edwards (1953, 1954a, 195~b
~pd

1954c) anti Pruitt (1962) have demonstrated that decision

based solely on max1m1z1ng expected value does not

~klhg

~~coijnt

for ~ significant (30 to 45 ~er cent) portion of the

variance.
~.

be~ldes

It can reasonably be assumed that other factors

logic and rationality, are involved in decision mak

~

T.herefore, the inclusion of risk as a factor in deci

ing.

sion making seems justified.
What are some of the factors of decision making
involving risk?

Certainly one of the first factors to con

slder 1s the probability of achieving a su'ccessful outcome,
i.e., the odds.

It is commonly assumed that low odds, that

Is, fewer chances of achieving a successful outcome, 1s
characteristic of a risky decision.

Therefore, based

strictly on a consideration of the odds, decisions where the
odds

~ere

low would be made less frequently or at least more

cautiously than deCisions where the odds were high.
would

~ertainly

This

be true if the decision were to bet ten dol

lars, where w1nning yielded a ten dollar gain and losing
resulted in a ten dollar loss.

If, however, the bet were

ohanged such that the loss of the wager resulted in addi
tional

p~nalt1es

one might be -less willing to

ac~ept

.

the bet

even though the odds were weighted toward a successful ·out
come.

I

~

t

:

I

~n

addition to odds, then, potential gains versus

.c~stsl~onstitutes the

1~

ifYOlVing risk.

ten,

~ach

second major factor in decision mak
G1ven identical odda, e.g., five in

of the following sets of gains versus eosts' may

c*eatk qi!ferent decisionB whether to accept the risk or

not:

GAIN

COST

Miss,1ng a class.

Missing a "pop" quiz.

$10,000;00.

Ten years in prison.

An evening with a
n1ce person.

Feelings of rejection.

A new Job, with more
money, prestige and.
responsib1'lity.

Failing at the new Job;
or, success with
ulcers.

Kogan and Wallach (1964) define risk in terms of two
concepts:

si~il~r

10$s
or failure.
.'
'

Neither of these two factors contributes

to the general assessment of risk in decision mak

eq~all~

Where odds may be critically important 1n a business

in~,.

I·

lack of certainty and the prospect of

ve~ture,

the prospect of

los~

or failure may be more impor

tant in dec1ding whether or not to go sky diving for the

rlrst time.
in the

Kogan and Wallach (1967) go on to define risk

foll~w1ng

way:

To talk about risk taking, then, is to refer to
behavior in situations where there is a desirable
"goal and a lack of certainty' tha t 1 t can be
atta1ned. The situations may take the form of

tt

7
r~qulr1ng a choice between more and leas desir
a'ble goals, with the former having a lower proba
bl,l1ty of attainment than the latter. A further
p'Qss1ble characteristic of ~uch situa·tions is the
threat of negative consequences for failure, so
that the individual at the post decisional state
might find himself worse off than he was before he
nia~e the decision (. p. 1151.
.

The above definition of r1sk, where "desirable goal"

and "lack of certaintylt are major factors, cannot be applied
tQ~

the situation of risk in many contexts without modifica

tl:on.

One characteristic of the def1nition is the implicit

as\~utnption

that the thing being risked is 1n the decision

ma~er'f s awareness; that is, in terms of the above defini tion

that the desirable goal is known.

Take for example, the de

cl~ion by an adolescent of whether or not to accept a bet

an illegal road race.

1n~olving

"del?.1rable
Frd~

the

goa~n

In this situation the overt

is to win the race and therefore the bet.

a subjective level the desirable goal may be to accept
live through

be~,

t~e

race, and most

impo~tantly,

the potential of being thought of as a "chicken.tr

avoid

From this

subjective point of view the teen-ager may be taking less
risk in racing than in declining.

The degree of risk in

this example seems to be a function of the individual '.s per
cep.~i()n

of what is at stake from both an objective and sub

Jective ·point of view.
The

p~tential

£or both objective and subjective

los~

is npt s.trictly limited to the growing pains of adolescents.

..........

,
------------------~~~

.!

\

,8

1

.1

I
I
II

,J

;,Ah9t~'kr

.p~ori

example may be helpful.

managed business.

Betty is a supervisor in a

\
I

j

In this context she is called upon

y

,t? lll~:re
.!

d~c1s1ons

pc)ait·~~n.
I

lmuch

of importance disproportionate to her

She is asked to work overtimej she Is not pa1d as

t

s she needs nor is worth; and the working conditions,

iboth fhYSicallY and emotionally, are terrible.

She has been

[aCti"lflY lookJ.rig for· a new Job and has been finally offered
'Ianother
position.
It

The new job would be almost the exact

~I

!re'ver~e of her present posit1on,:. She would receive more

roneY1 responsibility would be well-defined, working condi

t1pns~are excellent and the managerial staff has an excelI

~,

~eht ttepu,tation.·

1';W1ll

she take the new Job?

It seems likely if money J

torkl1g conditions, and managerial structure are the major

factori~
1n her emot1onal scheme of things. Yet there could
I .
be otti~r factors which would make moving to the other Job

. i
i
I
,

I
I

i:

J-rls~ proposition.

-,

One thIng that Betty 'c'oul,d risk in moving· to the new
~o~'1~'her sense of competence.
Be~ty ~s

in

In a poorly managed company

clearly a competent and important person, at least

~omparlson

to the other staff.

The risk involved in

cha~gt9g jobs 1s in finding out whether 'that sense of com

petence

~ill

carry over to the new job.

F,rom an existential standpoint the rl&ks for the teen
age~.a~d.Be~ty ar~

straightforward and therefore significant.

,
,

I

9

The teen-ager is risking his fledgling conception of man
"h~od.

His decision may be based less on the maintenance of

.,.
lIfe than
on the maintenance of his conception of himself as

a man.

For Betty the issue may be on~ of self-worth being

correlated with competence.

In the one Job her competence

stands out, but the conditions are terrible and the rewards
are few.

Taking the new Job" holds the potential of proving

that her competence was only relative to the incompetent
staff surrounding her.
The concept of tolerance of ambiguity (~renkel

B~n8wik 1949) is congruent with both the eXistential view
of r1sk described above and the meaning of rlsk implied by

th~ therapists cited earlier.

It also provides further sup

por~ that decisions involving risk taking are influenced by

subjective factors specific to the individual.

Tolerance of

ambigu~ty is conceptualized as an aspect of the personality
which is capable of accepting conflicting data without a
strong need to reconcile the differences immediately.

The

reverse J 1ntolerance of ambfgu i ty , is a ". • • preference
for familiar1ty, symmetry, definiteness and regularity,

.

.

• tend1ng toward black-white solutions (Frenkel- .

Brunswik 1949, P.' 112) ."

These tendencies are considered

to be perceptual characteristics found in association with
strong attitudes of prejudice and where repression is a

d~lnant defense mechanism.

A further characteristic of

1

1

I

•

10

1nt91e~a~ce
11

of ambiguity 1s the inab1l1ty to think 1n terms

.

"o~pr6b~~111tY and the avoidance of "uncertainty.
v~f:iual~t 1ntQlerant
1

An indi

of amblgu1 ty seeks to make fact out of

~

c1rQumstances where fact is unclear
kno~n taQto~s.

so

as to reduce the un

In terms of r1sk tak1ng, an 1nd1v1dual who

1s intolerant of ambigu1ty w1ll avoid s1tuations where the

ts not certa1n

ou~pdme

o~

close to it.

The Important point

1s ~hat ~he .outcome 1s certain, not necessarily whether it
1s $oOd: qr bad.

Oth;er research (Mar.tin 1954, Smock 1955a)" has sug
an

ges~ed ·th~t

in~1vidualts

response to ambiguous perceptual

slt\'istl:on,s may result from a specIfic organization of the
per$on~llty
I

wh1ch

~tructures

situations lacking 1n certainty.

The*efore', the individual who perceives the world from such
\c

a st:ructu,ring system will act to reduce incoming data to fit
thetsystem rather than have a piece of information that is
not ,copgI';lent with the structure".
sy~tem

Placing data into the

acts to reduce ambiguity •. The quality of the outcome

o,"maf not result 1n objectIve conclusion, as in the

ma~

ca~~

9t

Pteju~iee.

Ham~lt"on (1957) descrl,bes the process 1n the following
way:;
AVQld~nce

or ambiguity as a princ1ple of, and ex
of cognitive control 1s found in assoc1a
~lo~ with a relatively high degree of total
~~letYJ but part1cularly where the princ1ple
~rense mechanism adopted by the individual to

p~esslon

11

c6pe with anxiety and conflict is repression.

This

m~chanism leads the individual to deny reality
ra~~er than acknowledge it. It becomes generalized
tOf'~he

t$.

perceptual field of operation, where by nega

methods of l1mIt1ng and restrIct1ng the Indl

v."CalIS field of awareness and behavior, it tends to
a to the avoidance of responses which might result
1n uncertainty and anxiety, on account of the degree
ot perceptual conflict, equivocality and unstruc
turedness inherent in such situations. By avoiding
amb~guity, the Neurotic person, the Conversion
Hysteric and Obsessional in particular, would appear
to ~void both subjective uncertainty and conflict
r~l situations.
By avoiding uncertainty and con
flict, the individual would appear to avoid further
anx~ety (p.215).
l~

What I am proposing is that there are two major fac
tors

~n de~ision

making involving risk.

The first is the

overt data,
such as odds and potent1al outcomes and rewards
r
that are measurable.

The second factor is the potential

outcome in terms of existential anxiety and tolerance of
ambiguity.
:·11) terms of the overt data, one looks at the s1 tuat10n
in a

~ogical

dol~a~s

by

and rational manner.

betting on a football game when I know my chances

are about fifty-f1fty?tI

.r

"Yes,

"Can I afford to lose ten

In response the person might say,

have the money and would not feel any part1cular

-,
p~nch

'if I lose.

I also usually enjoy watch1ng the game

more i.r I have made a bet. II

The

odd~

are acceptable and the

potential loss 1n terms of money 1s tolerable.
ttn the second set of factors one is also logical, but
from'

all

d1ff;erent set of assumptions.

From the standpoint of

12

j
1

eX1stertlal anxiety or tolerance of ambiguity, the question

"

now be:comes, trCan I afford to lose ten dollars to that loud
.mouth'ln the off1ce who I know will remind me for weeks that
~

il

I 10st!1 the bet?"
ferentl~.

Given this data the response mlght be dif

For example,

If

That guy makes me so mad that if I

lost the bet I would probably be upset dally by h1s gloating.
t~ough

Even-

the bet 1s fa1r and I can afford the money, I

cannotjafford
to have him drive me crazy for the next month
.
1
if I lfse.
give

m~.

Therefore I will not take the bet unless he will

some points.

Then the odds· would be enough in my

i

favor ~o risk my emotional well-being."

j
.e~isteptlal.point'
A

sel~-w~rth
I

of view, is seen in terms of reduction of

resulting from the continual reminders that the

bet wa;3 lost.

I.

The loss, from an

The uncertainty of the situat.1on is apparently

great

~nough'in

bet.

$hat is, his tolerance of the ambiguous factors sur

round~g·the

terms of the potential loss to decide not to

bet is not high enough to accept the wager.

'ow d~es·the

above conceptualization of r~sk which

1nCIUd~e odds, tolerance of ambiguity and both objective and
• ~I

•

I

ex~stejtial

loss, fit with existing knowledge on alcoholism

and a110holiCS?

The following section will review the major

approaqhes to alcoholism, and provide a basis for relating
risk

I

t~klng

to alcoholism.

';

i

13
Alcoholism
Since the beginning of recorded history alcohol has
been used, and not infrequently abused by a wide variety of
cultunes.
~nd

In early societies alcohol was used for both food

,dp1nk; for medicinal purposes, and as a method for

reaching a state of religious ecstasy.

I

In modern societies

alcehol is used primarily as a social catalyst and a mood
eleva~or

(MacAndrew and Edgerton 1969).

'In spite of its continued use, alcOhol has been the
targe~

of .frequent warnings against over-indulgence.

Plato

observed that alcohol releases in man much that has other
wise Qeen kept dormant.

In Rome, Valerius Maximus enforced

a· stl'ict .prohibition against women drinking "lest thereby

they f!lll into some disgrace
~lassical

r McKinlay

1945, p. 14 J. It

scholar Arthur McKinlay (1945) reports that

Pope Clement I warned
• • • of the deadly association of wine and women;

he, criticizes,wornen for reveling in luxurious riot,

gulping down wine so as to make a show of themselves
hiccuping ostentatiously like men; he advises
boys and girls to keep away from wine as an arouser
of' the passions rpp. 14~151 .

an~

. In sixteenth century England, Thomas Nash (1592)
deli{leated more than one sort of drunkenness.

!

: 1

.

"N'or haue we

one or two kinde of drunkar'ds onely, but eight l(indes."

He

descrl-bes the nApe drunken who sings uand hollowes, and
daunceth for the heauens H ; the IILion drunken who throws pots

1.4
about the house" ; the uSwine drunken who lays ulumpish and
sleepleJ '

;

the Sheepe drunke, wise in his owne conceipt when

he cannot bring

forth a r1gh t word It ; the fifth 1s the tfMawd

len drunke, a fe1lowe who will weepe for kindness in the
midst of his ale"; the sixth is the "Martin drunke" who
drinks himself sober; the next is the "Goat drunken whose
mind turn.s to lechery; and finally there is the "Fox drunkeu
who becomes more clever and crafty when drinking (p. 467).
An American physician in the early nineteenth century
described some of the symptoms of d·runkenness in a similar
manner:

i
j

Certain· extravagant acts which indicate a temporary
tit of madness. These are singing, halooingj roar
ing, imitating the noises of brute animals, jumping,
tearing of clothes, dancing naked, breaking glasses
an~ china, and dashing other articles of household
rurniture upon the ground or floor (Rush 1811, p. 2).

I
I

More recently the Anti-Saloon League described on a

II'

poster

I·

individual who drinks:

~n

1913 the potential disaster that can befall an

Alcohol inflames the passions, thus making the
temptation to sex sin unusually strong. Alcohol
de,creases the power of control, thus making the re
sisting of temptation especially difficult. Avoid
all alcoholic drink absolutely. The control of sex
1mpu'lses will then be easy, 'and disease, dlshonor~
dtsgrace and degradation will be avoided.
And finally from'C. Nelson Davis, Psychlatrist-1n
ChIef of the Malvern Institute for Psychiatric and Alcoholic

.
I'

I

j.

Studies:

urn alcoholism, the equation is simply expressed:
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Man plus alcohol equals psychopathic behavior.

Man minus

alcohol equals a normally disciplined person [Davis 1962,
p. ll. tt

In

~he

face of the long and

ene~getic

history of cau

·tton and social disapproval associated with the abuse of
aleohol, one cannot help but wonder at the nature of a drug
powe~ful

enough to warrant risking the loss of family, work,

social standing, etc.

What then is the nature of alcohol

ism?

At present individuals who drink more than societal
'standards dictate are called "alcoholics," "chronic alco
ho11cs,rr "alcohol addicts," "addictive drinkers," and more
recently "problem drinkers."

The variety of different terms

used to describe the same problem provides some insight into
the divergence of theoretical orientations.
~here is no universally accepted definition of alco
holism, and many scholars contend that the term
encompasses a wide range of pathologica~ behavior
syndromes associated with alcohol use. In short, it
xn1ght be more appropriate to speak of "alcoholisms"
rather than alcoholism, since there are a number of
distinct disorders whose major characteristic is the
~a~hological seeking for and reaction to, the effects
of 'alcohol '(:. Roebuck and Kessler 1972, p. 3).

There is some common ground however.

Certain aspects

of alcoholism which are common to most theoretical formula

tions include the following:
1.
2.

Self destruction of the alcohol abuser.
Interfer~nce with the individual's physical,
mental and/or social functioning or adjustment.
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3.{ Exceed1ng the norms, dietary or social customs

qf the society in terms of quantity, frequency
and time and place of alcohol consumption.
4. 1 ~oss of control (i.e., the inability to stop
qrlnking) t: Roebuck and lCessler 1972, p. 121.
I

fecause of the diVerg~nce o~ t~eoretical orientations
and

i

be~ause
I

it is the most widely held, the World Health

.

or~an1*at1on

(1952) definition will be used:

Al~0~01iCS are those excessive drinkers whose de

pe~. dence upon
th~t it shows

alcohol has attained such a degree
a noticeable mental disturbance or
aOllnterference with their bodily and mental
he~lth, their interpersonal relations, their
sm~oth social and economic functioning; or show
tht prodromal signs of such development 1: p. 5).

there are three major theoretical approaches which
r,

. attemp~ to des.crlbe the etiology and nature of alcoholism.
A brief overview of these approaches 1s necessary to provide

II
an aderuate basis for later discussion.

the first general. theoretical approach takes as its
I

bas1c premise that the cause of alcoholism 1s basically

PhYS·iOio g tC8l.. This is the constitutional approach which
1

holds ~hat some physiological or structural defect produces
a pre~+sPo~ition which yields addiction when the individual
1s

1

Int~oduced

to alcohol.

f

Researchers
in this area have had some success.
I

examP11'

For

the search for a genetiC base r'or alcoholism has

prod~c~d supportive evidence (Kaij 1960, Partanan 1966,

Eysenclt 1967, McClearn 1959, Rogers 1967), both with human
and

nO~human

subjects.

And there is also some evidence that
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a

blache~ical

defect, which is an inherited metabolic de

fect, r.esults in nutritional deficiencies (Williams, Pelton

and Rogers 1951).

Another area of investigation (Tintera

1956) conceives of physiological alcoholism as a symptom of
a glandular disorder.
However, the research conducted in support of a con
stitutional theory has produced neither consistent nor con
clusive results.

Lester (1966), for example, has criticized

many of the constitutional studies on methodological
grounds.

And McCord, McCord and

Gu~eman

(1960), who con

ducted the-only in-depth longitudinal study on alcoholism
u~lng

human belngs, concluded that nutritional defiCiencies,

glandular disorders and hereditary factors are not signifi
cant factors in the etiology of alcoholism. _
The se"cond major theoretical approach is based on the
belief that an individual's psychological mechanisms and
personalIty are the major causes of alcoholism.
orientations have evolved from this approach.
·orl~ntations

will be discussed:

Several
Six of these

alcohol effects, reinforce

ment or learning theory, psychoanalysis, field dependence,
alcoholic personality, and transactional analysis.
The "alcohol effects" orientation 1s concerned with the
ways in which alcohol affects the alcoholic and the reasons
stated by the alcoholic for drinking.

Evidence from Mulford

and Miller (1960) supports the view that alcohol helps the
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alcoholic to feel better about himself and to deal with
others in a more constructive way.

Kinsey (1966), however,

found that alcoholics did not have a better self-concept
after dr1nking, and Tamerin and Mendelson (1969) discovered
that arter an initial euphoria, intoxication yielded feel
lngs of guilt, remorse, self-deprecation and protracted cry
lng spells.

i

'j

Another psychological orientation toward alcoholism is
in terms of reinforcement or learning theory.

For these

theorists, one develops a dr1nking problem because of the
reinforcing effects of alcohol.

For

example~

1n an un

familiar social sett1ng someone who d1scovers that alcohol
'reduces uncomfortable feelings will be more l1kely to drink
alcohol in a similar future situation (Conger 1951; Dollard
and Miller 1950).
The psychoanalytic orientation 1s 1n terms of pass1v
ity and regreSSion.

Fenichal (1945) claims that alcoholics

use the effects of alcohol

rt • • •

to sat1sfy the archaic

oral long1ng which is a sexual longing, a ,need for security,
and a need for the ,maintenance of self-est,eern simultaneously"
(p. 376).

Menninger (1963) views alcohol as symbolic of the

primal food (mother's milk) and that it works as an artifi
cial coping device to relieve stress.

The field dependence orientation (WItkin, Karp and
I

Goodenou'gh 1959) holds that p~rsonallty influences percep-·
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tion and is therefore understood 1n terms of modes of per
cept1on.

A field dependent individual relies on the visual

field in which the stimuli occur in making Judgements about
the stimuli.

Field dependent people have difficulty 1n

dealing analytically with themselves and their environment;
they tend to have difficulty in distinguishing boundaries
between self and others and in effect they have a poor sense

ot separate identity.

Karp, et a1. (1965)

conc1ude~

after a

review of literature prior to 1965, that studies generally
demonstrated that both male and female alcoholics are mark
edly

rield~dependent

in their perception.

TOe alcoholic personality orientation contains two
contrasti·ng and contradictory points of view (Roebuck and
Kessler 1972).

One view holds that

alcoholi~m

is a distinct

.entity and that alcoholics possess a specific personality
type which predisposes them to alcoholism.

The other view

1s that alcoholism is a symptom of some other form of psy

chiatric disturbance.
. The final orientation of the psychological approach

that will be dealt with in this study is that of Transac
tional Analysis (Steiner 1969).

The transactional orlenta

tfoil is of particular significance in terms of risk taking
and will be discussed in detail 1n the following chapter.
The

third and final major approach to explaining alco

holism 1s the soc1olog1cal approach.

This approach 1s not
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concerned with why a person becomes an alcoholic.

Its major

a1m is directed at explaining and defining rates of alco
holism for different groups.

Evidence from this domain has

demonstrated that cultural factors playa significant part
1n determining.drinking behavior.
For example, Sadoun,

and Silverman (1965) in

~olli

studying drinking patterns in France and Italy, reported
that although use of wine is common in both countries, inc1
de9ce of alcoholism is higher.in France.
fered

~rom

France also dif

Italy in terms of quantities of wine consumed

between meals, but not during meals, with the French drink
Ing more between meals than the

Italians~

The Italians have

a lower conception of the "safe limits" concerning the amount
of wine which can be consumed without harm than do the
French.

The Italians also do not hold with the French

belief that copious drinking is associated with virility and
that intoxication is fashionable.
Snyder (1958) describes the low incidence of alcohol
ism among Jews as function .of internal
wlt.h Jewish norms and customs.

p~essure

to conform

Alcohol consumption 1s

learned through ritual drinking which teaches Jews how to
drink 1n a controlled manner.
Cahalan .(1970) goes so far as to say that, "Whether

a person drinks at all is primarily a sociological and
anthropological variable rather than a psychological one'
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tPp.

20l-20~'J.1f

"•

• a

•

upon his

pe~son's

He qualified this contention by stating that
abuse of a substance is also dependent

pe~sonali ty

and his immediate environment

t:. p. 196). II

From the above data it should be apparent that an all
'encompassing explanation

fo~

alcoholism is not yet available.

Because a single model is lacking, an eclectic approach,
utilizing aspects from the various theories
be used to relate alcoholism to risk taking.

presente~will

The next chap

ter will review the literature of both risk taking and alco
holism as they relate to each other.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Only two studies were found dealing with risk taking
1n an alcoholic populatlon.

(1970)

arg~ed

In the flrst, Rule-and Besler

that alcoholics have difficulty maklng deci

sions and that alcohol reduces indecision.

To test this

hypothesis they administered a hypothetical dilemmas ques
tlonnaire to twelve hospitalized alcoholics and to twelve
alcohol counselors.

The questionnaire consisted of three

1tems from the Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire

(1964) and two alcohol related dilemmas.

The results indi

cated that the counselors were willing to accept lower odds,
that is, greater risks, than the alcoholic group.

The -mean

score for the alcoholics was 6.87 on a ten point scale with
one being very risky and ten very conservative, as opposed
to a mean score for the counselors of 5.38.
was significant at the p

<

The difference

.01 level.

The authors concluded by

sug~esting·the

following pro

cess:
It may be that drinking releases the alcoholic
from an overly conservative, inhibited stance and
moves him towards the other extreme, that of h~·h
risk taking. Thus alcohol presumably reduces
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1nh1bition. One major need for relief in the non
dr1nking alcoholic may stem from his conservatism
1n dec1s1on mak1ng [Rule and Besler 1970, p. 830).
The second study investigated ethical risk taking in
alcoholics.

The ethical risks hypothesis postulates that

'unethical behavior varies as a function of the'perceived
risk incurred by such conduct (Rettig 1963).
The author (Krause 1971) argued that one reason why an
alcoholic drinks 1s to reduce h1s fear of failure.

Using the

Behavior Prediction Scale (Rettig 1963) Krause measured the
reinforcement value of censure of three groups:

hosp1tal

l1zed alcoholics, psychiatric out-patients, and volunteers
from The Veterans of Foreign Wars.

The reinforcement value

of censure measures how sensitive one is to the magnitude
of censure or pun1shment resulting from gett1ng caught.

Of

the three groups, alcoholics were more sensitive to the re
inforcement value of censure than either of the other
groups.

The results also indicated that alcoholics were

more willing to take ethical risks than were the controls.
The authors thus concluded that the alcoholics had a higher
fear of fa1lure than the nonalcoholic and that alcohol acts
to reduce that fear, thereby increasing their willingness to
take risks.
With reference to risk taking and its relation to
alcohol intake for nonalcoholic
more data.

subject~

there is somewhat

Cohen (1960), for example, discovered that bus
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drivers were willing to negotiate more difficult driving
courses after they had been drinking than when sober.

The

task called tor the dr1vers to maneuver a bus through a
series of poles a standard distance apart before and after
ingest1ng alcohol.

In both drinking and sober trials

drivers were required to state their subjective Judgement as
to the

lev~l

of risk involved.

After drinking, the drivers

were willing to drive the bus through poles that were sig
nificantly narrower.

Interestingly, the drivers stated that

the subjective level of risk was the same under both sober
and drinking conditions.

Alcohol appeared to have modified

the drivers' perception of the risk involved, making the
drivers more willing to take objectively defined risks.
Teger, Katkin and Pruitt (1969) in a gambling experi
. ment concluded that subjects were more risky after drinking
than when sober.

They surmlsed that alcohol reduces fear of

failure 'and subsequently increases willingness to risk.
Ehlers (1966) ·found that subjects took greater risks under
the. influence of alcohol but only when the conditions of the
risk were familiar.
~lcohol

When the situation was unfamiliar the

·subJects were more cautious than the sober subjects.

Hurst (1969) 1n another gambling' experiment determined that
drink1ng subjects were more willing to make larger bets when
their personal estimate of the odds, their subjective proba

bility, was high, than when the subjective probab1l1ty was
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low.

Under the low subjective probability condition·the

subjects showed either no change in betting behavior or

became more cautious.
It would seem that fear of failure thus plays a slg
.ificant role in alcohol conaumption for alcoholics.

The

results of Krause (1971) and Rule and Besier (1970) would
a view that alcohol acts to reduce fear of failure

~upport

and may thereby make decision making and other action where
failure is an issue, less anxiety ridden.
Studies measuring risk taking' under conditions of
alcohol influence with nonalcoholic subjects have also
demonstrated that the ingestion of alcohol reduces fear of
fal1ure and increases wi11ingne.ss to take risks (Cohen 1960;
T~ger,

Katkin and Pruitt 1969).

(1966)

studle~

The Hurst (.1969) and Ehlers

however, indicate that there may be specific

situations where alcohol does not increase willingness to
risk.
There are two directions available at this point given
the absence of a significant amount of data relating alco
holism or alcohol and risk taking.

One might be to discuss

the theoretical and experimental evidence on alcoholism and
1~ent1ry

or

some implications for general

alcoholics.

risk-~king

behavior

A second alternative mlght be to relate some

ot the generally accepted character1stics of alcoholics to
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experimentally derived data about risk taking. , I shall deal
with both and start with the former.

Some models of alcoholism deal quite directly with the
concepts of risk and ambiguity.

The Transactional Analysis

model (Berne 1967, Steiner 1971) provides a basis for under
standing alcoholism in terms of risk taking because of its
concept of childhood decisions.
This theory postulates that from the moment a child is
born he begins receiving data about what the world is like.

In addition to the observational data the child receives
from his environment he also receives from his
j~nctions

p~rent8

in

on how he is to behave and also verbal data about

"lif,e ft and how to function in the world.

Based on this data

the child makes decisions on how he is going. to live up to
his parents,'requirements and still maintain his personal

autonomy.

For the alcoholic the early decision is that he

is "not OK" but that the rest of the world is all right.

The conflict for the child is that while he is not treated
in a way which allows him to feel good about himself, he
also sees that his parents are not living the kind of life

they are-demanding of him.

Therefore the complete early

de'olsion is that "I'm not OK and you are, ha, ha."

The

laugh signifies that underneath the admission of guilt is
the belIef that those people who are admonishing him for his
bad conduct are just as guilty as he.

:

;
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The remainder of the alcoholic's life 1s structured
a~round

creating situations which validate these early life

<lecislons.

The method for 8'ccompllshlng thIs feat is the

"Alcoholic Game" (Steiner 1971).

Risk for the alcoholic

trom a transactional point of view is to act 1n conflict
with the early life decision.

Much as Maslow (1968) and

Polster ('19('2) have indicated in terms of their therapies,
the individual thus prefers to remain in the security of the
known rather than risk the ambiguity and/or uncertainty of
the unknown.

In Transactional theory, security is to play
I

the "Alcoholic Game tt and thereby maintain the early, child
like view of the world.
It seems reasonable to assume that those individuals
who are unwilling or unable to tolerate a moderate amount of
ambiguity or to take a reasonable risk would be the ones
most likely to keep drinking as the best way to continue
_,playing the game.

Thus, one conclusion that m1ght be drawn

from the l1terature on Transactional Analysis is that those
alcoholics who demonstrate the greatest tolerance of ambi
gu1ty and demonstrate the 'greatest willingness to take
moderate risks would be the ones having the best prognosis.
It is important to note at thfs point that. r1sk and
ambiguity 1n a Transactional Analysis context refer to the
same thing:
unknown.

a capacity to withstand the pressures of the

Taking risks which virtually assure failure, low

l
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ot

odds

~uccess,

although risky in terms of odds are often

-the precursors of the next drinking episode.

4nother theorist (Bateson 1971) argues that sobr1ety

I

I!.

for

th~

dr1nki~g

alcoholic is itself the pathological state and that
provides some correction for this error.

words, compared with his sobriety, which is

1~

"In other

someway

'wrong' his intoxication must be in someway 'right' C P.2)."
The baSis for this logic is the epistemological position
that cc;>nscioue will, or nself" is separate and distinct from
the

re~lnder

of the personality.

What the alcoholic does

is to deny the unpleasant actions he takes in order to say:
"That wasn't I who did that, it was the alcohol," or, ItI
don't

~now wh~t

came over me."

In each instance the alco

holic separates his sense of "self" from behavior that is
incongruous with his idealized notion of himself.

Basic to

this separation, 1s the belief that conscious will is the
"self" and to be in tune with that will is to be all right.
~teBon
~

·trate

~is

uses the idea of "alcoholic pride" to illus

point.

Pride for the alcoholic is not contex

tually structured around past achievements.

Instead it is

structl,1red aroupd a response to -.the challenge of ur can
quit n or, trI can stay sober."

The emphaSis 1s in the chal

lenge with success being less important than the act of

ach1evtng success.
dlmini~hes

After a period of success the challenge

and the new challenge becomes,

If

I can take a
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drink and not go on a binge."

It is now no longer good

enough to say,

Thu s the challenge component

nI

have qu it. IP

ot Ifalc-oholic pride" 1s linked to risk taking with the
principle being, Itr can do something whel'e success 1s im
. pX'obable and failure would be disastrous C' Bateson 1971,
p.

91.

If

It seems that for an alcoholic there are two accept
able states.

One is the drunken condition which is void of

any responsibility for either selt or others.

The second

state is to be sober, but sober in a way which makes the
•'1

alcoholic appear superhuman--someone who can, at will,
return to drinking at an acceptable level.
The challenge component of pride is further reduced
from the stated test of selt-control, III can take a drink
and stop," to the unstated and unstateable purpose of prov
lng that self-control is ineffectual and absurd.

The pro

position that self-control will not work is a policy decision
formed

II.

•

•

in the levels of the mind Lwhich] are pre

linguistic and the computations which go on there are coded
in primary process t. Bateson 1971, p. 121. n

The risk of tak

ing a drink to prove that it can 1s in reality a "set-up"
which will prove that it cannot be done and that. therefore
selt-control is not attainable.
Both articles would agree that risk for the alcoholic
need be defined from the alcoholic's

po~nt

of view.

30

Therefore, in measuring risk taking 1n

~n

alcoholic, one

need be aware that odds and probabilities are not the sole

basis on "which to Judge whether the person is risking or
~ot.

For most people, the act of taking a drink by an

alcoholic may seem a tremendous risk in terms of the poten
tial for him to return to uncontrolled drinking.

For the

alcoholic the act of taking a drink may be the best way to
continue playing the "Alcoholic Game" and prove that self
control is absurd.
By

looking at both the data on alcoholism and the

data on risk taking several overlapping areas can be found.
Both Krause (1971) and Rule and Besier (1970) referred to
"fear of failure" as a motivating force in the behavior of
alcoholics.

"Fear of failure" may also be construed as a

motivator in general risk taking behavior.
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell (1953) devel
oped a theory of achievement motivation that incorporates
the concept of fear of failure and risk taking.

The model

postulates that there are two kinds of motives for situa
tions in which one is attempting to meet a criterion of
excellence:

the mot1ve to achieve success and the motive

to avoid failure.

All people are supposed to have each of

these mot1ves, but 1n varying degrees.

These two motives,

when combined with an individual1s subjective probabilities
and incentives, yield a measure of risk-taking behavior.

1

I
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Expressed algebraically these, are:
Motivation

= (MsxPsx1s)

+ (MfXPfXIf).

Me = Motivation to achieve success.

= Subjective probability of success.
Is = Incentive value of success.
Ps

are the motivation, probability and incentive
values associated with avoiding failure.
When motivation to achieve success is stronger than
motivation to avoid failure, the total motivation factor is
strongest when the probability values are at .5.

The fol

lowing example should illustrate this point:
(MsxPsxIs = Approach) + (MfXPfxlf + Avoidance)

= Resultant

2

0.1

0.9 = 0.18

1

0.9

-0.1 = -0.09

0.09

2

0.5

0.5 =

0~50

1

0.5

-0.5

=

-0.25

0.25

2

0.9

0.1 =,0.18

1

0.1

-0.9 = -0.09

0.09

Therefore, individuals in whom the motivation to achieve
success is stronger than the motivation to avoid failure'
should be drawn to situations of intermediate difficulty,
those possessed of moderate odds.

Those 'individuals with

stronger mot1vat10n to avoid failure will choose situations
where the odds are either very high or very low.

A conser

vative response, high odds of success, 1s consistent with
the individual's need to avoid failure.

The risky low odds

of success response is also a way of dealing with fear of
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failure because with very low odds, success is generally not
anticipated by those evaluat1ng one's performance.
Studies by Atkinson, Bastion, Earl and Litwin (1960)
and Atkinson and Litwin (1960) were supportive of the
achievement motivation model.

However, since those experi

ments, Littig (1963) and Raynor (1966) have posed questions
as to the generalizability of the construct in different
situations.

Under experimental conditions where

com~etition

is an issue, fear of failure subjects preferred high risk
choices over extreme conservatism .. Also under competitive
conditions l high need achievers demonstrated an increasing
preference !or conservative bets as the experiment went on.
In general, however, the model still seems valid for non
competitive situations and therefore useful 1n terms of the
present study.
Given that "fear of failure" is a motivating force for
alcoholi-cs, one might hypothesize a preference for extreme
conservatism o.r risk as being likely.

One could further

hypqthesize that a reduction in this preference for extreme
odds would be indicative of a reduct'ion in "fear of failure"
and

ther~fore

a reduction in the motivation to drink.'

Studies on field dependence (Witkin, Karp and
Goodenough 1953; Karp, Witkin and Goodenough 1959) have
demonstrated that alcoholics are more field dependent than
are nonalcoholics; that is, very dependent on the visual
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field in which the stimuli occurs in terms of making judge
ments about the stimuli.

Another group of studies (Wertheim

and Mednick 1958; Meyer, Walker and Litwin 1961) have demon
s'trated that field dependence 1s posit1vely correlated with
high fear of ,failure.

High field dependence and high fear

of failure go together.

From this line of reasoning we

arrive at the conclusion that alcoholics will be more likely
i'

to advocate odds e1ther risky or conservative as opposed to
moderate odds.
Yet another way of relating the work on field depend
ence and alcoholism 1s to examine the definition.

Field

dependent people seek structure from the environment and
view the environment as controlling them as opposed to their
controlling the environment.
regarding

individu~ls

Risk-taking data (Rotter 1962)

who see the locus of control as being

external show that these people
either risky or conservative.

~referred

odds which were

Those seeing the world as

something which can be controlled preferred moderate risks.
Kogan and Wallach (1967) conducted experiments seeking
to determine whether risk-taking strateg1es were generalized
throughout a series of different contexts.

In each context

the subject chooses a risk-taking' strategy and must stay with
that strategy for a f1xed period of time.

At some point the

'experimenter offers the option of changing. strategies.
Persons with high motivational disturbances, as measured

34
by test anx1ety and defensiveness scores, exhibited sub

. stantial degrees of constancy 'in their risky or conservative
strateg1es.

Those with low motivational disturbance scores

showed more variability in strategies between the different
tasks.

They seemed to see more options and were willing to

use them.

When offered an opportunity to change strategies

those who scored low on the'motivational disturbance scales
took advantage of the opportunity if they were losing.
is, their risk-taking strategy was not working.

That

Those who

scored high on the motivational disturbance scales and were
losing, did not express a desire to change their strategies.
On the

contra~

they seemed satisfied with their bets.

Kogan and Wallach (1964) concluded:
• • • not only does the risky conservative behavior
of maximally disturbed individuals seem strongly
generalized in the sense of showing high consistency
across varying tasks and situational contexts, but
th1s behaVior also tends to lead the individual into
maladapt1ve postures toward his environment tp. 203).
On the 'basis of this data one might expect that alco
holics who show little change in their risk taking strate
gies would continue to behave in the same "maladaptive"
manner as before and therefore continue to drink.
In summary, the author feels the data on risk taking
and alcoholism appear to warrant the following conclusions:
1.

Reduction of "fear of failure ll is a motivating
force for the nondrinking alcoholic and the
1ngestion of alcohol seems to reduce this fear.
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2.

Scores for alcoholics on risk-taking instruments
will show a preference for odds of extreme risk
and/or oonservatism
as a positive function of
IIrear of failure. 1I That is, as Iffear of failure"
decreases, preference for extreme odds will
reduce.

3.

"Risk" for alooholics should be measured in terms
of tolerance of ambiguity or moderate odds and
not for extreme risk taking.

CHAPTER III
METHODS
Procedure
Sixty hospitalized alcoholics were given the Kogan
Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionna1re (Kogan and Wallach

1964) upon admission to the Dammash State Hospital Alcohol
Treatment Program.
have

volun~arily

Criteria for subject selection was:

to

agreed to part1cipate in the research, and.

to have been admitted to the Alcohol Treatment Program no
longer than four days prior to completion of the testing.
No further requJrements were made of the subjects unt1l four
days prior to discharge from the Alcohol Treatment Program.
Within that four day period each subject was again given the
Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire.

Since only one

form of the questionnaire was used, each subject therefore
responded to .the same items twice; once on admission and
once

OIl

discharge.

Procedure for administering the questionnaire was as
r~llows:

each subject was seen indlyidually.

The

subJ~ct

was asked to read the instructions, after which any ques
tions he had were answered.

When the subject had stated

he understood the requirements of the task he was then asked

I

,

i.
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to explain in his own words what he was supposed to do.

Any

. errors in his understanding of the task were corrected be
fore allow-tng the subject to complete the questionnaire.
Subjects who could not grasp the requirements of the ques
tionnalr~

in the experlmenter 1 s

the sample.

Judgmen~were

The questionnaire was then

excluded from

compl~ted

in the

presence of the experimenter.
Adm1nistration of the questionnaire at the t1me of
discharge differed from the 1n1t1al procedure 1n the follow
ing ways:

1)

Subjects were aga1n required to paraphrase

the task of the questionna1re, to the satisfact10n of the
exper1menter, but this time they were not requ1red to re
read the 1nstruct1ons.

2)

Subjects were not requ1red to

complete the quest10nna1re in the presence of the experi
menter because of the frequent conflict between Program
requirements and experimenter availability.

Subjects com

pleted the questionna1re at their convenience and returned
it before leaving the hospital.

3)

Subjects were not told

why they were taking the quest1onna1re the

'sec~nd

time until

Just pr10r to d1scharge and only at the1r request.
All subjects were told that participation in the re
search was voluntary and that all responses would be held in
strict eonfldence.

The questionnaire was descr1bed as a

device for measuring att1tudes and op1n1ons and 1t was
emphasized that there were no r1ght or wrong answers.

: i

: 1
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Add1tionally, the subjects were told that the research was
being conducted as part of the author's education and that

any direct benefit to them was likely to be small.
pose of the research was explained

a~

The pur

an attempt to measure

how individuals with drinking problems viewed different
sorts of decision-making dilemmas.
Data concerning attendance at the out-patient clinics
was collected by Alcohol Treatment Program staff as part of
their own record keeping.

The experimenter used the Program

records to obtain out-patient attendance data pertinent to
this research.
: ;

In this manner three sets of primary data were ob
tained.

: I

The first consisted of questionnaire response dur

ing the early stages of the treatment program.

The second

consisted of questionnaire responses Just prior to discharge
or atter the treatment program was virtually completed.
~inal

The

data was the frequency of attendance at the out

patient clinics after the subject was discharged from the
hospital.

For subjects to be considered attending an out

patient clinlc, they had to come to the clinlc four times
during the three month follow-up period.

Risk-Taking. Instrument
The Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ)
(Kogan and Wallach 1964) consists of twelve situations, each
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containing a central person faced with a choice between two
courses of action.

One of these courses entails a greater

risk of fallure, but also yields greater rewards if suceess
ful.

The second course of act10n is to choose a safe,

st~ble,

non risky, but less rewarding alternative.

The sub

Ject's task is to advise the person in each of the twelve
situations by selecting the probabIlity of success con
s1dered sufficient to warrant choosing the risky alterna, j

I

t1ve.

,

1

The author feels there are several drawbacks to us1ng
this questionnaire as a measure of risk taking.

The most

obvious is that subjects are not required to risk anything.
The measure 1s hypothetical.

Another potential difficulty

involves the complexity of the task, in terms of the sub
Ject's capacity to understand and provide valid answers.

A third problem area 1nvolves the content of the items, in
that the Bituations may not tap the real world of the alco
hollc and they are exclusively male oriented.
The first drawback'is', in part, a spec1fic case of the
general1zed question of whether or not one can take data
gath~red

1n a laboratory and extrapolate to the real world.

More specifically, the question 1s whether one

u;e

c~n

general

from a hypothetical measure of risk taking to a real,

albe1t laboratory, measure and then from the laboratory to
the real world.

Evidence to date (MYers and Sadler 1960;
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Katz 1962; and Suydam and Meyers 1962) suggests than an in
dividual's strategy or attitude toward risk taking remains

generally con£tant over the two conditions, but may shift
slightly toward conservatism 1n the real risk-taking situa
tions.
The second area of concern--the capacity or the sub
Jects to provide va11d,responses--was controlled via the
administrat10n procedures outlined earlier in this chapter.
The th1rd problem area, that of the content of the
dIlemmas, could have been reduced by developing a question
naire that would include alcohol dilemmas appropriate for
both men and women.

The pragmatic factor of

t~me

involved

1n developing such a questionnaire precluded this as an
alternative.
There were many advantages to using the CDQ.

The

first, was that the questionnaire had been used in a variety
of other risk-taking experiments and thus provided a base
for discussion of data from the present study to others.

A

second advantage to using the CDQ was the capacity of the

questionna1re to prov1de data on both odds and amb1guity.
The third advantage also deals with the content of the
items.

Although the items may not tap the real world of the

alcoho11c, both male and female, they do attempt to present
a serles of problems which are closer to reality than many
of the other measures of risk taklng.

The typical measure

I

I

1

'
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of risk taking (other than the CDQ) involves partic1pation
·In some sort of game-like situation.
The Therapy Program
The Dammasch State Hospital Alcohol Program is funded
by a Federal grant and has a stafr that consists of two phy
sicians, two social workers, six casemanagers; one clinical
psychologist, five registered nurses and twenty psychiatric
aides.

The simplest way to describe the operation of the

program is to outline the process by which an individual is
admitted, treated and followed after discharge.
Males are admitted to the general
tor detoxification.

peych~atric

wards

Women are admitted to the ward on which

the program takes place, but are not involved in the program
until after they have been detoxified.

The length of the

detoxification process varies, but it usually takes five
days.

During this time period the individual is contacted

and informed of the nature and content of the Alcohol Treat
ment Program, and the alternatives available throughout the
hospital.

Should the patient request admission to the pro

gram he is given the MMPI and an appointment for screening.
Admiss10n to the program 1s not automatic.

The

screening process includes an evaluation of the patient's
mot1ves, needs and desires and the capacity of the hospital
program to meet them.

At the screening meeting a treatment
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contract is worked out and, if admitted, the patient is
,transferred to the program ward the same day.

The contract

tor treatment includes a stated desire to change or modify
some aspect of their personality that 1s workable in the
hospital setting.

The contract also indicates the patient's

agreement to participate in the program and an agreement to
stay in the program for the 'required length of the therapy,
thirty days.
Individuals not admitted to the program will typically
state that they have no desire to quit drinktng and they are
only in the hospital to recover their physical strength; or
'that they are only interested in getting off the wards where
all the "crazy" people are; or that they do not feel any

need for change in their behavior except to stop drinking.
Approximately 80-90 per cent of those requesting admission
are, in fact, admitted.
The program itself is centered around participation in

a wide var1ety of group therapy experiences.

Many of the

groups are oriented to provide an atmosphere where an indi
vidual can discuss his or her problems arid receive feedback
from the therapist and/or other group membera.

The remain

der of the groups have specif1c topic areas or techniques,

but at the core of all
feelings.

gI"OUPS

is the goal of expression of
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The names of groups and their agendas are listed
below:
Alcohol Orientation Class - This meeting 1s held
three times each week for one hour. All patients
are expected to attend. The meeting consists of
a series of lectures on alcohol and alcoholism.

A.A. - Alcoholic Anonymous meetings are held in,the
hospital twice each week and all patients are
encouraged to attend.
Assertiveness Training - This group is designed to
look at feelings around subassertive behavior and
to provide techniques and' opportunities to prac
tice assertive behavior.
Logotherapy - Logotherapy is essentially a group
whe~e individuals look at the goals in their lives
and evaluate whether they are going about achiev
ing these goals in an efficient or productive man

ner.

Women's Group -'The women1s group is devoted to
looking at the problems of women in our society
and specifically women with d~inking problems.
Couple's Group - Marital or relationship counseling
1s emphasized here. Particular attention is paid
to communication skills.
Recovery, Inc. - This organization is similar in
goals and structure to A.A., but includes indivi
. duals with problems of a strictly emotional nature
in addition to alcohol related problems.
Relaxation Therapy techniques.

~nls

group teaches relaxation

Relat10nship Improvement - EmphasiS i8 placed on
discovering the ways in which individuals under- .

mine th~ir relationships with others and provides
an arena for practicing new techniques.
.

Looking Inside - Increasing onels self-awareness is
the goal.

44
Transactional Analysis - Thi& group looks at the
problems of alcoholism from the perspective of
the alcoholic game.
, Attendance as Change
The use of attendance at the ou't-patient clinics as a
criteria for change was chosen for three reasons.

First, it

was the clinical opinion of the Alcohol Program staff based
on experience that patients who do not attend follow-up
counseling show a higher rate of recidivism than those who
become involved in the out-patient clinics.
Saenger (1966) also found this to be true.

Gerard and
The following is

an excerpt from their study on "Out-Patient Treatment of
Alcoholics":

I

!
I

r

!

I

r

I
!

Extent of treatment was associated with improvement
in dr1nking. (The reader is reminded that the
pat1ents were classified in three groups·with re
spect to extent of contact: minimal (one to four
visits), moderate (fiv~ to ten visits), and per
sistent (eleven to more than twenty visits). Only
11 per cent of the group who had minimal contact
with the clinics improved in drinking, compared to
15 per cent of those who had moderate contact, and
21.4 per cent of those with perSistent contact.
Extent of contact with the clinics was also asso
ciated with prolonged abstinence at any time during
the year between intake and follow-up; and with
improvement as measured by the index of change in
over-all adjustment. For example, patients who
changed at least moderately 1n over-all adjustment
(that is, dropped an average of at least one point
from each of the five component indices), were found
far more often among those who had perSistent or
,moderate contact with the clinics than among those
wi th minimal contact (x = 37; p = .001) t: pp. l34-36l.
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They concluded by stating that extent of contact at the out
patient clinics was directly related to improvement in
dr1nk1ng and secondarily related to improvement 1n the other
aspects of functioning.
A second reason for using out-patient attendance was
that the very act of going to the out-patient clinic may in
~tself

be a measure of willingness to risk.

The Federal

Grant Proposal was based on the belief, supported by the
patients, that a major reason for not attending out-patient
clinics was that they were unsure of what to expect or how
they were going to be treated.

Sapir (1958) in her article

about out-patient clinics for the treatment of alcoholism
states that one of the functions of the intake interview
18 to

ft • • •

reduce the new patient's fear of what he has

let himself in for by coming to the clinic Cp. 1291."
A third and very critical reason for using attendance
at out-patient clinics as the improvement criterion was one
of methodological pragmatism.

That is, given the resources

available to the author a comprehensive follow-up study
looking at the multiple aspects of a patient's functioning
after discharge was not possible.
Analysis
. Because risk for alcoholics cannot be measured
strictly in terms of odds, two additional measures will be
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used:

ambiguity and preference for extreme odds or sure

bets.

These measures are operationally defined in the fol

lowing section.
The data will be analyzed in two ways.

First, in

terms of changes between pre-program testing (PrPT) and
post-program testing (PoPT) as a function of the variables;
sex, age, days in
~ety

pr~gram,

and defensiveness.

and MMPI scale scores for anx

The last three variables require

further definition.
For age, PrPT and PoPT scores will be divided into
three age groups:

thirty and under, N

N. = 26; and 51 years and over, N

= 17.

= 17; 31-50

years,

Scores will be

analyzed in terms of changes within each group and dif
ferences between groups for both testing cOQditions.
For anxiety and defensiveness, subjects will be
divided into two groups using a median split with the two
scales. '

Defen~iveness

and anxiety scales were taken from

An MMPI Handbook (Dahlstrom and Welsh

1960).

The resulting

groups will be ijigh Defensiveness/High Anxiety (HD/HA),
and Low Defensiveness/Low AnXiety (LD/LA).

II

Scores will be

analyzed in terms of changes within groups and differences

I

!

between group s •
For days in the program, again PrPT and PoPT scores
are divided 1nto three groups composed of subjects who re
mained in the program less than twenty-one days, subjects

47
who stayed twenty-two to

twenty~elght

·remalned twenty-nine days or more.

days and subjects who

Scores will be analyzed

in terms of differences between groups and changes within
groups.

The second method of analysis will be to divide the
entire sample into two groups composed of subJe,cts who
attended the out-patient clinics after discharge and sub
Jects who did not.

The groups will be called the follow-up

group (FU) and the non follow-up group

(NFU). Data will be

analyzed 1n terms of differences in P'rPT and PoPT, change
scores and the variables of age, sex, days, and defensive
ness and anxiety.
Operational Definitions
Odds.

Odds will be operatlonally defined in this

study as the sum of the lowest acceptable probabilities ad
vocated by the subject.

Therefore, given twelve items, the

most conservative score would be 120.

That would require

the subject to check the response, UNo" for each item, mean
lng that under no circumstances should the hero of the
I

I
I

dllemmas risk his present pOSition.

The .most risky score

1

i.
i

would be twelve, which would mean that the subject was will
ing to recommend probabilities of one in ten for each item.
I

The sum of twelve ltems with a "Noll response is ten, twelve
tlmes.

The sum of twelve ltems with a one in ten response

1s one, twelve times.

!
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Example:

Subject X advocated the following proba

. bil1ties for each item:
1.

3 in 10

7.

5 in 10

2.

7 in 10

8.

9 in 10

3.

5 1n 10

9.

No (or 10 in 10)

4.

1 in 10

10.

3 1n 10

5.

9 1n 10

11.

7 1n 10

12.

9 1n 10

6 .. 3 in 10

1

The sum of the first number in the probability statements 1s
the odds score.

For the example stated above the score

would be seventy-one.
Ambiguity.
odds score.

The ambigu1ty score is der1ved from the

It is assumed that the odds, f1ve in ten, 1s

the choice with the greatest ambiguity.

~e

rationale is

that those odds offer the least information as to the poten
t·ial outcome.
failure.

One has equal chances of either success or

Scores of three in ten and seven in ten are

equally ambiguous because one is 70 per cent sure of the
outcome.

In the case of the risky choice, three in ten,

one can be fairly sure that the outcome will result 1n fail

ure.

In the case of the conservative choice,

se~en

in ten,

aga1n one can be 70 per cent sure that the outcome will re
sult in suceess.

In terms of tolerance for ambiguity it is

not important whether the outcome is success or failure, but
Just that the outcome is predictaple.

The same line "of rea
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.soning holds for one in ten and nine 1n ten, at a 90 per
cent assurance of the outcome.
the "No"

i

respons~

When the individual chooses

he is saying, tlI am not w1lling to risk

anything," and this represents the least toleranoe for ambi

\.
I

gUity.

Ambiguity scores are calculated by assigning a score

of one to the probabilities choice of five in ten; three to
the probabilities choice.s of both three in ten and seven in
~en;

five to the probabi11ties choices of both one in ten

and nine in ten; and six to the "No" response.
Example:

Transformation of Odds score into Ambiguity

score:

3 "in 10

3

Item 7.

5 1n 10

1

2 •. 7 in 10

3

8.

9 in 10

5

3.

5 in 10

1

9.

II

4'.

1 1n 10

5

10.

3 in 10

3

5.

3 in 10

3

11.

7 in 10

3

6. .,9 1n 10

5

12 •

9 in 10

5

Item 1.

NO "

6

The Ambigulty score for:· this group of probability choices is
forty-three.

I
II

:
~

Sure Bets.

These are the responses which consist of

. th.e odds, one in ten, nine in ten, and "No."

Choice of one

of these three probabilities is indicative of·a desire to
have maximal certainty.

Sure Bets w1ll be scol'ted in term's

of frequency of choice of one of these probab1lities in each
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questionnaire.

A Sure Bet score of five on a questionnaire

.would indicate that on five of the twelve items the subject
advocated one of the sure bet probab1l1ties.
Increased Risk Taking.
\

many of the hypotheses.

This phrase will be used in

In each case it will mean a decrease

in the scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for supe
bets.

A decrease in the odds score reflects a willingness

to accept fewer chances of success, or increased riskyness.
A decrease in ambiguity scores is indicative of increased
tolerance of ambiguity.

A decrease in preference for sure

bets reflects that the subject is advocating fewer sure
bets.

All decreases are. determined between 'pre-program

testing and post-program testing.
Alcoholics.

It is assumed that individuals requiring

hospitalization for their drinking problems meet the require
ments outlined in the World Health Organization definition.
Therefore, "Alcoholics" is defined as those individuals
admitted to Dammasch State Hospital with a diagnosis of
alcohol addiction.
Hypotheses
HYQothesis #1.

The follow-up group (FU) will show

larger changes between pre-program testing (PrPT) and post
program testing (PoPT), in the direction of increased risk
taking, than the non follow-up 'group (NFU) for odds, ambi
guity, and preference for sure bets.
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Hypothesis #2.

The FU group scores for odds, ambi

'gu1ty and preference for sure bets will be lower numerically

in the PoPT oondition than the NFU group_
Hypothesis #3.

Subjects categorized in terms of high

defensiveness and high-anxiety will show less change in risk
scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets than
those subjects categorized as low defensiveness and low anx
iety.
Hypothesis #4.

Differences between PrPT and PoPT for

odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets will be greatest
with younger subjects in the direction of increased 'risk ,
taking and differences will decrease with increased age.
Hypothesis #5.

Risk scores for the age group th1rty

years and under will be less than scores for age group
thirty-one to f1fty years which will be less than scores for
f1fty-one years and over.
HYpotheSis #6.

Differences between PrPT and PoPT

scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets will
increase as a function of increased number of days spent
part1cipat1ng in the program.
H~PQthesls

#7.

There will be no

signifi~ant

differ

ences between men and women for odds, ambiguity, or prefer
ence for sure bets in either the pre or post-program testing
scores.
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Hypothesis #8.

There will be no sign1ficant dlffer

·ences between men and women for odds, ambIguity and prefer

ence for sure bets 1n terms of amount of change between PrPT
and PoPT •
.DefinItion 'of Symbols
Pre-test sum of lowest acceptable probabl1i
. ties.
Post-test sum of lowest acceptable probabili
ties.
Bl

Pre-test sum of amb1gu1ty scores.

B2

Post-test sum of ambigu1ty scores.

l

Cl -

Frequency of scores falling in the Bet defined
\ by ftems numbers 1, 9, or No, in pre-program
condition. (PSB)
Frequency of scores falling 1n the set defined
by items numbers 1, 9, or No, in post-program
.condition.

PrPT - Pre-program testing.
PoPT - Post-program testing.

FU-

Follow-up group.
patient clinics.

NFU

Non follow-up group.
out-pat1ent c11n1cs.

Subjects attending out
Subjects not attending

I

!

, !

:j
: 1

: 1

I

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The chapter will be organized into three sections.
The first section will present the results and analysis
of data specifically related to the hypotheses.

The second

section will present f1nd1ngs relating the secondary var1
abIes (age, sex, etc.,) to attendance at the out-patient
.. clinics.

The third section will discuss all of the results

and suggest possible interpretations.
Section 1
Hypothesis #1.

The follow-up group (FU) will show

larger changes between pre-program testing (PrPT) and post
program testing (PoPT) in the direction of increased risk
taking l than the non follow-up group (NFU) for odds, ambi
gu1ty, and preference for sure bets.
The mean scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for
aure bets in the pre-program (PrPT) and post-program (PoPT)
testing conditions for the follow-up group (FU) are pre

.,

sented in Table I.
INote that on page 50, "increased risk taking" is de
fined in terms of decreases in scores for odds, ambiguity,
and preference for sure bets. See definition for further
explanation.
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TABLE I
~N

RISK SCORES FOR FOLLOW-UP GROUP

i

I

I
I

r
I

I

. Preference For
Sure Bets

Odds

Ambiguity

PrPT

75.61

44.22

5.65

PoPT

66.42

38.70

4.04

All scores changed in the direction of increased risk
taking.

The t test for related measures (Bruning and

Kintz 1968) was utilized to evaluate differences between
the two testing conditions.

The .05 probability level of

significance for a one tailed test was used.

Differences

are statistically significant for all three measures:

odds,

= 3.052, df = 22, P < .01; ambiguity, t = 4.198, df = 22,
P < .001; preference for sure bets, t = 4.021, df = 22,
p < .001.
t

Mean scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for
sure bets in the pre and post-program testing conditions for
the non follow-up group (NFU) were not significantly dif
rerent at the .05 level.

(Table 11)
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TABLE II

MEAN RISK SCORES FOR NON FOLLOW-UP GROUP

Odds

Ambiguity

Preference For
Sure Bets

PrPT

68.75

'41.69

4.47

PoPT

66.78

39.86

4.33

One way that the FU and NFU groups seem to differ is

1n terms of change in risk-taking attitudes.

The FU group

risk scores changed in the direction of increased risk tak
ing to a significant degree whereas the NFU group risk

scores did not.

To further evaluate the differences between

the two groups in terms of changes in risk scores the mean
change for odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets was
compared.

The mean change was calculated by averaging the

d1fferences between PrPT and PoPT scores for each risk mea
sure.

In Table III, 9.19 represents the average change for

the odds score between PrPT and PoPT for

~he

follow-up

group.

For the 'non follow-up group the average change was

1.97.

The differences in the rnean change for all risk mea

sures were tested for significance using the t' test for
independent means (Bruning and Kintz 1968).

The .05

probability level of significance for a one tailed test was

.~

used.

The FU and NFU mean change were significantly dif

.ferent for all measures with the FU mean change being larger
1n each case:

t

= 1.93,

df

odds, t

= 57,

p

t = 2.50, df = 57, p

= 1.923,

df

= 57,

p

< .03;

ambiguity,

< .03, preference for sure bets,
< .01.
TABLE III

MEAN CHANGE SCORES FOR RISK MEASURES

IN FU AND NFU GROUPS

Preference For
Sure Bets

Odds

Ambiguity

PO

9.19

5.21

1.61

Nru

1.97

1.83

.14

DIFFERENCE

7.22

3.69

1.47

Based on the above data, Hypothesis #1 is accepted.
The follow-up group changed significantly in the

d1rectlo~

of increased risk tak1ng whereas the non follow-up group did
not and the amount of change was significantly larger for
the follow-up group.
Hypothesis #2.

The FU group scores for odds, ambi

guity and preference for sure bets will be lower numerically
in the PoPT condition than the NFU group.

57
Table IV presents the PoPT means for odds, ambiguity

I.
1

and preference for sure bets for the

·FU

and

NFU

groups.

differences are barely in the predicted direction.

The

That is,

the FU group scores are only slightly less than the NFU
group scores and the differences are insignificant.

There

fore Hypothesis #2 is not accepted.
TABLE IV

POST-PROGRAM RISK ~NS FOR
FU AND NFU GROUPS

Odds

Ambig':1 ity

Preference For
Sure Bets

FU

66.42

38.70

4.04

NFU

66.78

39.86

4.33

Hypothesis #3.

Subjects categorized in terms of high

defensiveness and high anxiety will show less change in risk
scores for odds, ambiguity and, preference for sure bets than
those subjects categorized as low defensiveness and low
anXiety •
•
1
1

!I

Table V presents the mean amount of change of subjects

\

\

\
\

"

in the high defensiveness/anxiety and low defensiveness/
anxiety categories for odds, ambiguity and preference for
sure bets.

I

r

)
/'
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I

I

'

TABLE V
CHANGE SCORES FOR RISK MEASURES
IN MMPI CATEGORIES

.
i

I

High Defensiveness/
Anxiety

\

Odds

Ambiguity

Preference For
Sure Bets

16.38

6.25

.25

.44

2.00

.57

Low Defensiveness/
Anxiety

I

I
I

, ,

In the low d{efensiveness/anxlety category the differ
.
ences between PrPT and PoPT for each risk measure are insig
nificant at the .05 level.

In the high defensiveness/anxiety

category the differences between PrPT and PoPT are signi
ficant for odds (t

\

= 2.074,

df

= 7,

tailed test for related measures.

p

< .05)

for a one

There are no significant

differences for ambiguity or preference for sure bets.
The odds measure was the only measure where there was
a significant difference between the two groups, high de
fensiveness/anxiety and low defensiveness/anxiety, in terms
of mean change score (t
1
I

I

r
!

= 1.g8,

df

= 22,

p

< .05).

There

were no significant differences in terms of mean change
scores for the other two measures, ambiguity and preference
for sure bets.
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With the only significant differences being in the
category not predicted by the hypothesis, clearly the hy
~

pothesis 1s rejected.

1

I

Hypothesis #4.

Differences between PrPT and PoPT for

I·

ad.ds, ambigui ty and preference for sure bets will be greatest

1

with younger subjects, in the direction of increased risk

I

.

.

I

taking, and ·differences will decrease with increased age.

i
i

Pre-program and post-program test scores for odds,
ambiguity and preference for sure bets are presented in
Table VI in terms of three age groups; thirty years and
under, thirty-one to fifty years, and fifty-one years and
older.

The letters Al and

A2

refer to the mean odds scores

for PrPT and PoPT respectively; Bl and

~

represent ambi

guity in PrPT and PoPTj and C1 and C2 refer to preference
/

for sure bets in PrPT and PoPT.

/'

TABLE VI
MEAN RISK SCORES BY AGE
FOR PrPT AND PoPT

·c 1

30 and under

72.41

72.29

41.55

38.47

4.53

3.71

31-50

70.81

62.46

44 .73 . 40.35

5.58

4.31

51 and over

72.12

67.77

40.59

4.53

4.18

38.35

,

~
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The d1fferences between PrPT and PoPT in odds, amb1
gu1ty and preference for sure bets for the th1rty years and

I

under group were not signif1cant.

\

fifty years age group the PrPT and Po?T scores were s1gn1f1

I'

For the thirty-one to

'cantly d1fferent for all measures of r1sk, with the changes
in the direction of 1ncreased risk tak1ng.

I

I
I
1

= 25, p < .01; for amb1
guity the difference was 4.385, t = 3.246, df = 25, p < .001;
for odds was 8.347, t

= 2.906,

df

for preference for sure bets the difference was 1.269,
t

1
I

The d1fference

= 2.741,

df

= 25, p <

.01.

Only in the odds measure did

the f1fty-one years and older group change s1gnif1cantly,
t

= 2.093, df = 16, p < .05.

For both amb1gu1ty and pref

erence for sure bets differences were not s1gnif1cant.

The

t test for related measures was used in the foregoing analy

S1~.
There were also no significant differences between the
three age groups in terms of the mean change between PrPT
and PoPT us1ng the t test for independent means.

Therefore

th1s hypothesis 1s rejected.
Hypothes1s #5.

Risk scores for the age group thirty

years and under will be 1e35 than scores for th1rty-one to
f1fty years, which will be less than scores for fifty-one
years and over.
There were no signif1cant differences between any of
the age groups for any of the risk measures in the pre-

I• .

.
I
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program testing condition.

In the post-program testing con

dition there was a significant difference between the odds
scores of age group thirty-one to fifty years and thirt,y
Y,ears and under with the former being lower
df

= 41,

p

<

.05).

(t = 2.052,

The hypothesis that younger subjects

will advocate greater risks is rejected.

The t test for in

dependent means was used In the above analysis.
BYPothesis #6.

Differences between PrPT and PoPT

scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets will
increase as a function of increased number of days spent
partiCipating in the program.

Mean risk scores for odds, ambiguity and preference
tor sure bets for the three categories according to days in
program are presented in Table VII.
TABLE VII
MEAN RISK SCORES BY DAYS
FOR PrPT AND PoPT

Odds
PoPT

PrPT

PoPT

PrPT

21 days
·and less

71.0

70.6

47.9

44.0

6.6

5.7

22-28 days

73.0

68.1

41.9

39.2

4.7

3.8

69.8

62.4

40.6

'36.2

4.5

3.6

or more

1

Preference
For Sure Bets

PrPT

29 days

1

~mbiguity

PoPT
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There are no significant differences between PrPT and
PoPT for any of the risk measures 1n the days category
twenty-one days or less.
~wenty-two

For the days 1n program category

to twenty-eight days,

were significant dif

the~e

= 2.755, df = 29,
= 29, p < .05) but not

. ferences between PrPT and PoPT for odds (t

P < .01)

and ambiguity (t
.

.

= 2.257,

for preference for sure bets.

df

All differences 1n the twenty-

nine days and over oategory were significant:
t
p
p

odds,

= 2.118, df = 18, p < .05; ambiguity, t = 3.416, df = 18,
< .01; preference for sure bets, t = 1.830, df = 18,
< .05. The t test for related measures was used in the

above.
Analysis of the mean change scores for each of the
three groups revealed no significant differences in terms of
anyone group changing to a greater degree than any other.
The t test fop-independent means was used in each case for a
one tailed, .05 level of significance.
Although there seems to be movement towards increas
lngly significant differences as a function of days in the
program, the magnitude of the differences is not significant
and therefore the hypothesis is rejected.
Hypothesis #7.
1.

There will be no

significa~t

dlffer

erences between men and women for odds, ambiguity, or pref
erence for sure bets in either the pre or post-program
testing scores.
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Table VIII presents the risk scores for men and women
in the PrPT and PoPT testing conditions.

There are no sig

nificant differences for either ambiguity or odds in either
testing condition.

For odds there were no significant dif

ferences in the post-program testing condition, but there is
a significant difference in the pre-program testing condi
tion, t

= 2.326,

df

= 58,

p

< .05. The hypothesis is gen

erally accepted.
TABLE VIII
MEAN RISK SCORES FOR MEN AND WOMEN·

IN PrPT AND PoPT

Ambiguity

Odds
Men

Women

PrPT

69.49

PoPT

65.09

Hypothesls #8.

Men

Preference
For Sure Bets
Women

Women

Men

79.38

44.15

4.96

5.08

72---1-6

38.46

4.19

.3.77

There will be no significant dif

ferences between men and women for odds, ambiguity and pref
erence for sure bets in terms of amount of change between
PrPT and PoPT.
The mean amount of change between PrPT and PoPT for
men and women is presented in Table IX.

I

I.

There are no
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significant dIfferences, for any of the risk measures,
between men and women.

Therefore this hypothesis is accept

ed.

,

TABLE IX

MEAN CHANGE FOR MEN AND WOMEN
BETWEEN PrPT AND PoPT

\

I
I

i
\

I
I

Preference For
Sure Bets

Odds

Ambiguity

Women

6.62,

5.69

1.31

Men

4.40

3.00

.77

Section 2
Each of the variables age, sex, MMPI scores and days
in program were also analyzed in terms of attendance at the
ou,t-patient clinics.

Age.

Two measures were used to determine if age was a

factor in attendance aL-the out-patient clinics.,
was the mean age of the two groups.
follow-up group was 43.48.
group

wa~

39.65.

The first

The mean age for the

The mean age of'the non follow-up

The difference is 3.83, but is not sta

ttstically Significant.
The se'cond measure for age

~as

frequency of subjects

in each.age category attending the clinics.

In the thirty

and under category 29 per cent (five of seventeen) attended
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In the thirty-one to fifty catego17, 34 per cent

follow-up.

(nine of twenty-six) attended follow-up.

In the fifty-one

and over category 55 per cent (nine of seventeen) attended
follow-up.

Testing for statistical significance was not

done du·e to time limitations.

However, the data suggest

that increased age was related to increased attendance.
Further study seems warranted.
Sex.

The number of women subjects attending follow

up was six

(N = 13), which represents 46 per cent of the

female sample.

The --number of men attending the out-pa tient

clinics was seventeen out of forty-seven, or 36 per cent.
T~ere

appears to"be a tendency on the part of the women sub

jects to attend out-patient clinics more often than men.
Statis"tical analysis was not conducted however, and this
conclusion 1s made with caution.
MMPI Scale Scores.

The percentage of subjects attend

" 1ng the 'out-patient clinics for the two MMPI groups was:

Low defensiveness/anxiety

= 18.7

teen); high defensiveness/anxiety

per cent, (three of six

= 37.4 per cent, (three

of eight).
Analysis was not done due to time limitations and the
small N.
i '

Again, detailed analysis with larger samples may

yield significant results.
Days in Program.

The mean number of days in the

treatment program for the follow-up group was 27.48.

J

The
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mean number of days for the NFU group was 25.51.
,terence is 1.97 and not significant.

The dif

The percentage of sub

Jects attending FU for each day',s category group 1s:

27.2

per cent for twenty-one days or less, (three of eleven);

40 per cent for twenty-two to twenty-eight days, (twelve of
thirty); and 42.1 for twenty-nine days and over (eight of
nineteen).

Although not analyzed statistically, the data

appear to indicate that length of time spent in program is
a factor in attendance at the out-patient clinics.
Section 3
The hypothesis that the FU group would nave larger
changes than the NFU group was supported both 1n terms of
changes within each group and differences between amount of
change between groups.

The FU group changed significantly

in all measures of risk and changed in a significantly
larger amount than the non follow-up group.

The NFU group

did not change significantly between the two testing condi
tions.
The second hypothesis, that the follow-up group would
have scores which would indicate greater ,willingness to
risk, greater tolerance of ambiguity and lower preference
for sure bets was not supported.

There were no significant

differences between FU and NFU groups for any of the risk
measures, for PoPT.

That is, at the end of the program all
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of the subjects were scoring the same on the risk measures
·and presumably willing to ftrisk n at the 'same level.

The

only pair of scores which were signif1cantly d1fferent be
tween the two groups was the odds scores in the PrPT condi
tion.

The question then arises, that if there are virtually

no significant differences between the two grqups in both
te.sting conditions, where do the differences in change
scores come from?

Table X presents the scores for both

groups in terms of the sequence high scores to low scores.

TABLE X
RISK SCORES FOR FU AND NFU
GROUPS IN SEQUENCE

A

B

C

FU GROUP/Pre

75.61

44.22

5.65

NFU GROUpjpre

68.75

41.69

4.47

NFU GROUP/Post

66.78

39.86

4.33

FU GROUP/Post

66.42

38.70

4.04

The FU

gr~up

in each case started from a pos1tion of

greater conservatism yet arrived at a score by the end of
program which was virtually the same as the NFU group.

The

NFU occupied the middle of the progression such that the
d1fferences between both the pre and post-program testing

.
J
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was not large, but the differences within the groups between
.pre and post-program testing was significant for the FU
group.
The major difference between the two groups was not
riskyness, tolerance of ambiguity or preference for sure
bets at the end of the program, but the amount of change
that occurred on these measures between the testing dates.
One explanation for the above data would be in terms
of the reinforcement value of change.

The individual who

changes, in a positive direction, using a specific technique
is going to be more likely to use that same technique to
i~duce

further change.

For example, a golfer finds that

instruction of a particular kind improves his game by 20
per cent.

Another golfer using the same

te~hnique,

improves

only 5 per cent; such that at the end of the instruction
both golfers are playing at the same level.

The improvement

1s reinforcing of the type of instruction used and logically
the extent of ·improvement will be a factor in the extent of
the.reinforcement.

Therefore, should the two golfers

deCide, in the future, to seek further instruction, the in
dividual who changed the most is going to be more likely to

use

the same kind of instruction than the individual who

changed the least.
With the alcoholics, the increased capacity or toler
ance ef risk taking would correspond to a reduction in "fear
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of failure."

Those subjects who experienced the greatest

-reduction in "fear of failure" will need to relate this
change to the experiences of program and probably the thera
peutic

strateg~

used in the program.

Therefore, when faced

with-the option of participating in an out-patfent situation
using a similar strategy, the subjects

achievi~g

the greatest

benefit or change would most likely choose to continue.
Those subjects who felt little change would find little rea
son to participate, because that particular technique has
not proved useful so far.
A second explanation might be that the large change
from relative conservatism and structuredness to a position

ot less structure or more risk leaves the individual in a
new and somewhat uncomfortable position.

The new position

1s more uncomfortable for the subjects who changed the most
because it is further removed from the old position and
therefore more aspects require integration.

The uncomfort

ableness of the new position is therefore a function of the
lack of fam1liarity of the new behavior and feelings.

Al

though these new feelings and actions may be more adaptive
and satisfying, they are nonetheless unfamiliar and there
rore could produce some anxiety.
It may also be that the out-patient clinic serves as a
source of security and support for these individuals.
Attending groups at the out-patient clinics could provide
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an atmosphere where the individual would receive continued
support and reinforcement for new behavior as well as a
place where difficulties could be discussed and worked
through.

The out-patient clinic

mig~t

thus provide a tem

porary structure for the individual while he restructures or
integrates the new perceptions, feelings and behaviors.
It is also possible that these phenomena could be
working simultaneously.

For the individual who is seeking

to continue the growth process, or just to maintain the
growth or change already made; the choice of attending the
out-patient clinic could be one using a proven technique
because it is supportive and helps solve problems.
Clearly the hypothesis that high defensiveness and
anxiety would yield smaller changes on the risk measures
than low defensiveness and anXiety was not supported.

There

is even some data that suggests that the reverse conclusion
might be more accurate.

It seems reasonable, in hindSight,

that given a motivation to change, those individuals suffer
ing the most (high defensiveness and anxiety) will be the
ones most eager to reduce this suffering, that ls, change.
Even if

t~e

data had been conclusive, there would be a

problem in interpretation due to a methodological oversight.
In the Kogan and Wallach (1964) study from which this hypo
thesis was derived, the risk-taking data was collected
within a few days of psychological testing.

Therefore it is

71
valid to conclude that the psychological data was represent
ative of the subjects while they were undergoing the risk

tak1ng experiments.

In the present

study~-for

most sUbJects-

over three weeks passed from beginning to completion of the
risk-taking study.

It is unknown whether or not a partic

ular subject who scored in the high defensiveness/anxiety
range on admission, would still score in that range three or
four weeks later when the second risk-taking questionnaire
was administered.

To test the hypothesis as stated, one

would need to know the defensiveness/anxiety scores at the
time of both risk-taking test conditions.
The hypothesis that length of stay in the program
would increase the amount of change between testing condi
tions was supported in part by the increasing progression of
statistically significant results.

There were no signifi

cant differences for any of the risk measures in the twenty
one days or less category.

In the twenty-two to twenty

eight days category, two measures produced significant dif
ferences, odds and ambiguity.

In the third category,

twenty-nine days and over, all three measures yielded
significant differences.
However, the critical factor for this hypothesis was
the extent or degree of change. ·When the average degree of
change for each risk measure was compared with the different
categories, there were no significant differences (see Table

VII).
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Age seemed to have an effect on change scores, but not
'in the predicted manner.

Rather than the youngest subjects

showing the greatest change, the middle (thirty-one to
rlfty) group changed the most and was, the only group that
changed significantly in all measures of risk'.

The only

other significant change was in the fifty-one .and older
group, for odds.

All change' scores for the youngest group

and for the other two measures in the fifty-one and over
group were nonsignificant.

The numerical value of the

scores were also nonsignificant for all measures in PrPT
and all but one in PoPT.

That is, there wer.e no significant

differences between scores in PrPT and the only significant
difference in PoPT was between thirty and under and thirty
one to fifty-one, with thirty-one to fifty-one being
riskier.
The hypothesis that the sex of subjects would not be a
factor in either the numer1cal values or the extent of
change was largely supported.

In only one instance was

there a significant difference for either numerical values
or mean change scores.

Summary of Results
1.

Attendance at the out-patient clinics was related
to change in risk-taking scores from admission to
discharge.

All measures of risk showed positive

changes that were statistically significant".
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2.

Discharge or post-program test scores d1d not pre
dict attendance at the out-patient c11nics.

3. There are no major differences between risk scores
with age as a variable.

The time frame th1rty-one

to fifty years did appear to show the greatest
potent1al for change in risk taking.

Age does not

seem to be a clear factor in attendance at the
out-patient clinics.

4.

Again, there is no clear difference between risk
taking scores of men and women.

Sex does not

appear to be a significant factor in attendance
at the out-patient clinics.

Further study with a

larger female sample may prove dIfferent, because
the women attended 10 per cent more often than did
the men.

Sex, however, may be a factor in attend

ance at the out-patient clinics.

Further study

seems warranted.

5.

High defensiveness/anxiety did not yield smaller
change scores than d1d low defensiveness/anxiety.

6.

There was an increase in a number of significant
differences as a function of increased number of
days 1n the treatment program.

There were, how

ever, no significant differences between FU and
NFU groups 1n terms of average number of days in
the program, nor were the mean change scores sig
nificantly different.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Re'search Diff1cul ties
There are two major problems with this research in
terms of interpreting 'the results and coming to any conclu
sions.

The use of attendance at the out-patient clinics as

a measure of change is the first.

The measure does not lack

validity, it just does not provide enough data on how the
client is functioning after discharge.

Clearly, a more com

prehensive follow-up would be useful and should include
further testing of the client's risk-taking propensities.
The second problem involves the use of the same instrument
to derive the three different measures of risk taking.
Other research in this area would want to use measures of
odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets that are inde
pendent of each other so as to determine situational and
personal differences.
Recommendations for Further Research
There is need for continued research in three general
areas. The first is in terms of determining the relation
ships between the three risk measures in different situa
tional contexts.

For example, are there risk-taking
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situations which tend to elicit high preferences for extreme
odds and a low tolerance for ambiguity?

A second area of research m1ght be to relate the rlsk
taking attitudes of different groups to one another.

For

example, how does the hospitalized alcoholic's perception of
risk compare with that of a non drinking out-patient, or
with that of a "cured" alcoholic?

Do alcoholics view risk

from the same perspective as do depressives, hysterics,
etc.?

Additionally, the relationships of risk taking and

age are not clear.

Why did the thirty-one to fifty year old

age group change more than the younger and presumably more
flexible subjects?

How do alcoholics compare with social

drinkers and non drinkers 1n terms of the three measures of
risk?

Would risk-taking attitudes change in different kinds

of therapeutic situations; for example, behavior modifica
tion versus gestalt?

And if so, in what ways?

A third area of research might be to compare risk tak
ing to other kinds of behavior.

Specifically, follow-up

studies where the criteria for change are more comprehensive
might be done.
Implications
If continuing in the therapeutic process is a goal in
treatment, then, based on the data presented in this study,
one of the major areas of emphasis suggested would be in
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giving the client feedback as to whether or not he was
.changing in the desired direction.

It appears that rela

tively large changes are rewarding by themselves.

Small

changes, however, may require an outside source of rein
in order for the client to feel sufriciently re

forc~ment

warded.

Systems need to be developed whereby the client and

staff can determine if change has occurred, and if the
change is perceived as positive by the client and the staff.
Additionally there needs to be ways of reporting and reward
ing the new behavior.

Development, and especially the

conduct, of such a program would be no easy task.

Such an

effort would require specifIc goals, specification of be
havioral criteria, methods of quantification, and most of
all, time.
Two other implications can cautiously be drawn from
the data in terms of models of treatment leading to attend
ance at out-patient clinics.

One is that there seems to be

a period of time when the alcoholic is potentially 'more sus
ceptible to change in his risk-taking attitudes and possibly
to change in a number of other areas.

While the middle age

category changed most, the fifty-one and over category had
the highest rate of attendance.

The youngest group, on the

other hand, changed least and had the lowest rate of attend
I.

ance.

It may be that people with drinking problems who are

relatively young are not ready emotionally to change.

For

77
these individuals other forms of therapy may be more effec
tive.

A second implication for treatment is that indivi

duals who did not remain in treatment for at least three

.

weeks were less likely to attend the out-patient clinics.

j

Alcoholics are experts at creating emergencies which would
recommend an early discharge, yet it may be that not remain
ing in the treatment program for the required length of time
is prejudicial to successful treatment.
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APPENDIX A
CHOICE DILEMMAS PROCEDURE
OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE
Instruotions.

On the following pages, you will find

a series of situations that are likely to ooour in everyday
life.

The central person in each situation is faced with a

choice between two alternative courses of action, which we
m1ght call X and Y.
I

Alternative X is more desirable and

attractive than alternative Y, but the probability of

t

lp

atta1ning or achieving X is less than that of attaining or

I

achievtng Y.

!

For each s1tuation on the following pages, you will be
asked to indicate the minimum odds of success you would
demand before recommending that the more attractive or de

sirable alternative, X, be chosen.
Read each situation carefully before giving your judg

ment.

Try to place yourself in the pos1tion of the central

person in each of the situations.
tions in all.
1.

There are twelve situa

Please do not omit any of them.

Mr. A, an electrical engineer, who is married and

has one child, has been working for a large

I

J

ele~tron1cs

84
corporation since graduating from college five years ago •
. He is assured of a lifetime Job with a
quate

salary~

On the other

modest~

though ade

and liberal pension benefits upon retirement.
hand~

it is very unlikely that his salary will

increase much before he retires.

While attending a conven

tion, Mr. A is offered a job with a small, newly founded
company which has a highly uncertain future.

The new job

would pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a
share in the ownership if the company survived the competi
tion of the larger firms.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. A.
several

probabilitl~s

Listed below are

or odds of the new company's proving

flnancial·ly sound.
Please check the

lowe~t

probabIlity that you would

consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. A to take
the new Job.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
I

The chances are 5 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the company will prove
financIally sound.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the
financially sound.

comp~ny

will prove

Place a check here if you think Mr. A should not
take the new job no matter what the probabilltl~s.

I

I

Mr. B, a

2.

45-year~old

accountant, has recently been

.informed by his physician that he has developed a severe
heart ailment.

The disease would be sufficiently serious to

force Mr. B to change many of his strongest life habits-
reducing his work load, drastically changIng his diet, giv
ing up favorite leisure-time pursuits.
s~ggests

The physician

that a delicate medical operation could be attempted

which, if Buccessful, would completely relieve the heart
condition.

But its success could not be assured, and

~n

fact, the operation might prove fatal.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. B.

Listed below are

several probabilities or odds that the operation will prove
successful.
Please check the lowest probability that you would
consider acceptable for the operation to be performed.
Place a check here if you think Mr. B should not
have the operation no matter what the probabili
ties.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the operation will be
a success.
The chances are

a success.

7 in 10 that the operation will be

The chances are 5 in 10 that the operation w1ll be
a success.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the operation will be
a success.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the operation will be
a success.
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Mr. C, a married man with two children, has a

3.

-steady job that pays him about $6000 per year.

He can

easily afford the necessities of life, but few of the lUx
uries.

Mr.

CIS

father, who died recently, carried a $4000

life insurance policy.
money in stocks.

Mr. C would like to invest this

He is well aware of the secure "blue-chip"

stocks and bonds that would ·pay
vestment.

approxiw~tely

6%

on his in

On the other hand, Mr. C has heard that the

stocks of a relatively unknown Company X might double their
present value if a new product currently in production is
favorably received by the buying public.

However, if the

product is unfavorably received, the stocks·would decline in
value.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. C.

Listed below are

several probabilities or odds that Company X stocks will
double their value.
Please check the lowest probability

t~at

you would

consider acceptable for Mr. C to invest in Company X Stocks.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the stocks will double
their value.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the stocks will double
their- yalue.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the stocks will double
their value.
I
I·

I

The chances are 7 in 10 that the stocks will double
their value.
The

chance~

their value.

are 9 in 10 that the stocks will double
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Place a check here if you think Mr. C should not
invest in Company X stocks, no matter what th~
probabilities.

4.
Coll~ge

Mr. D is the captain of College

football team.

X 1s playing its traditional 'rival, College Y, in

the final game of the season.
seconds, and Mr.
score.

XiS

Colle~e

DiS

The game is in its final

team, College X, is behind in the

X has time to run one more play.

Mr. D,

the capta1n, must decide whether it would be best to settle
for a tie score with a play which would be almost certain to
work, or on the other hand, should he try a more complicated
and risky play which could bring victory if i,t succeeded,
but defeat if not.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. D.

Listed below are

several probabilities or odds that the risky play will work.
Please check the lowest probability that you would
cons1der acceptable for the risky play to be attempted.
Place a check here if you think Mr. D should not
attempt the risky play no matter what the proba
bIlIties.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the risky play will
work.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the risky play will
'Work.

The chances are 5 in 10 that the risky play will
work.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the risky play will
work.
The chances are 1 1n 10 that the risky play will
work.
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5.

Mr. E is president of a light metals corporation

in the United States.

The corporation is quite prosperous,

and has strongly considered the possib1lities of business
expansion by building an add1tional plant in a new location •
. The choice is between building another plant in the U.S.,
where there would be a moderate return on the initial in
vestment, or building a plant in a foreign country.

Lower

labor costs and easy access to raw materials 1n that coun
try would mean a much higher return on the initial 1nvest
ment.

On the other hand, there is a history of polit1cal

instability and revolution in the foreign country under con
sideration.

In fact, the leader of a small minority party

1s committed to nationalizing, that is, taking over, all
foreign investments.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. E.

Listed below are

several probabilities or odds of continued political sta
bility in the foreign country under consideration.
Please check the lowest probability that you would
consider acceptable for Mr. Ets corporation to build a plant
1n that country.
The chances are 1 1n 10 that the foreign country
will remain politically stable.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the foreign country
will remain polit1cally stable.
The chances are 5 1n 10 that the foreign country
will remain politically stable.

;

l'

I .
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The chances are 7 in 10 that the foreign country
will remain politically stable.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the foreign country
will remain politically stable.
Place a check here if you think Mr. E's corporation
should not build a plant in the foreign country, no
matter what the probabilities.

6.

Mr. F is currently a college senior who 1s very

eager to pursue graduate study in chemistry leading to the
Doctor of Philosophy degree.
Un1versity X and University Y.

He has been accepted by both
University X has a world

wide reput.at10n for excellence in chemistry.

While a degree

from University X would signify outstanding training 1n this
field, the standards are so very rigorous that only a frac
tion of the degree candidates actually receive the degree.
Un1versity Y, on the other hand, has much less of a reputa
tion in chemistry, but almost everyone admitted is awarded the
Doctor of Philosophy degree, though the degree has much less
prestige than the eorresponding degree from University X.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. F.

Listed below are

several probabilities or odds that Mr. F would be awarded a
degree at University X, the one with the greater prestige.
Please check the lowest probability that you woul.d
consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr'. F to enroll
1n University X rather than University Y.
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Place a check here if you think Mr. F should not
enroll in University X, no matter what the proba
bilities.
The chances are 9 1n 10 that Mr. F w.ould receive a
degree from University X.
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr
degree from University X.

F would receive a

The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
degree from University X.
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
degree from University X.
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
degree from University X.

7.

Mr. G, a competent chess player, is participating

in a national chess tournament.

In an early match he draws

the top-favored player in the tournament as his opponent.

Mr. G has been given a relatively low ranking in view of his
performance in previous tournaments.

During the course, of

his play with the top-favored man, Mr. G notes the possibi
l1ty of a deceptive though risky maneuver which might bring
him a quick victory.

At the same time, if the attempted'

maneuver should fail, Mr. G would be left 1n an exposed
position and defeat would almost certainly follow •
.

.

'

Imagine that you are advising Mr. G.
several probabilities or odds that

MI~.

GiS

Listed below are
deceptive play

would succeed.
Please check the lowest probability that you would
consider

aCQ,~ptable

attempted.

for the risky play 1n question to be

I

, l

,I
i
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The chances are 1 in 10 that the play would succeed.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the play would succeed.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the play would succeed.
The chances are'7 in 10 that the play would succeed.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the play would succeed.
Place a check here if you think Mr. G should not
attempt the risky play, no matter what the probabilities.

8.

Mr. H, a college senior, has studied the piano

since childhood.

He has won amateur prizes and given small

reci tala, ,suggesting that Mr. H has considerable musical
talent.

As graduation approaches, Mr. H has the choice of

going to medical school to become a phYSician, a profession
which would bring certain prestige and financial rewardsj or

I
I

Ii
I
!

I
I

i
II
!

entering a conservatory of music for aqvanced training with

i

!
l

a well-known pianist.

Mr. H realizes that even upon comple

tion of his piano studies, which would take many more years
and a lot of money, success as a concert pianist would not
be assured.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. H.

Listed bel.ow are

several probabilities or odds that Mr. H would succeed as a
concert p1anist.
Please check the lowest probability that you would
consider acceptable for Mr. H to continue with his musical
training.

j

!
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Place a check here if you think Mr. H should not
pursue his musical training, no matter what tne
probabilities.
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as
a concert pianist.
The chances are 7 in 10 that· Mr. H would succeed as
a concert pianist.
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as
a concert pianist.
The. chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as
a concert pianist.
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as
a concert pianist.

9.

Mr.

J is an American captured by the enemy in

World War II and placed in a prisoner-of-war camp.

Condi

tions in the camp are quite bad, with long hours of hard
physical labor and a barely sufficient diet.

After spending

several months in this camp,. Mr. J notes the possibility of
escape by concealing himself in a supply truck that shuttles
in and out of the camp.

Of course, there is no guarantee

that the escape would prove successful.

Recapture by the

enemy could well mean execution.
ImagIne that you are advising Mr. J.

Listed below are

several probabilities or odds of a successful escape from
the prisoner-of-war camp.
Please check the lowest probability that you would
consider acceptable for an escape to be attempted.
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The chances are 1 in 10 that the escape would
succeed.

The chances are 3 in 10 that the escape would
succeed.

The chances are 5 in 10 that" the escape would
succeed.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the escape would
succeed.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the escape would
succeed.
Place a check here if you think Mr. J should not
try to escape no matter what the probabilitieS:
10.

Mr. K is a successful businessman who has parti

cipated in a number of civic activities of considerable
value to the community.
leaders of

h~s

Mr. K has been approached by the

political party as a possible congressional

candidate in the next election.

Mr. Kls party is a minority

party in the district, though the party has won occasional
. elections in the past.

Mr. K would like to hold political

office, but to do so would involve a serious financial sac
rifice, since the party has insufficient campaign funds.

He

would also have to endure the attacks of his political 0ppo
nents in a hot campaign.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. K.

List~d

below are

several probabilities or odds of Mr. KIs winning the elec
tion 1n his district.
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Please check the lowest probability that you would
consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. K to run
for political office.
Pl'ace a check here if you think Mr. K should not
run for political office no matter what the proba
bilities.
-The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr
election.

K would win the

The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. K would win the
election.
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. K would win the
election.
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. K would win the
election.
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr
election.
Mr. L, a married

11.

30-year~old

K would win the

research physicist,

has been given a five-year appointm"ent by a major university
laboratory.

As he contemplates the next five years, he

realizes that he might work on a difficult, long-term prC?b
lem which, 1f a solution could be found, would resolve basic
"scientlfic issues in the field and bring high scientific
honors.

If no solution were found, however, Mr. L would

have little to show for his five years in the laboratory,
and this would make it hard for him to get a good job after
wards.

On the other hand, he could, as most of his profes

s10nal associates are dOing, work on a ser1es of short-term
problems where solutions would be easier to find, but where
the problems are of lesser scientific importance.
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Imagine that you are advising Mr. L.

Listed below are

.several probabilities or odds that a solution would be found
to the difficult, long-term problem that Mr. L has 1n mind.
Please check the lowest probability that you would
consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for' Mr. L to work
on the more difficult long-term problem.
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the
long-term problem.
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the
long-term problem.
The chances are 5 in '10 that Mr. L would solve the
long-term problem •

..

.

The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the
long-term problem.
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the
long-term problem.
Place a check here if you think Mr. L should not
choose the long-term, difficult problem, no matter
what the probabilities.

II

12.

Mr. M 1s contemplating marriage to Miss T, a girl

1

1·
I

whom he has known for a little more than a year.

I.

however, a number of arguments have occurred between them,

Recently,

suggesting some sharp differences of opinion in the way each
views certain matters.

Indeed, they decide to seek profes

slonal advice from a marriage counselor as to whether it
would be wise for them to marry.

On the basis of these

meetings with a marriage counselor, they realize that a happy
marriage, while possible, would not be assured.
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Imagine that you are advising Mr. M and Miss T.
L1sted below are several probabilities or odds that their

marriage would prove to

,-

b~

a happy and successful one.

Please check the lowest probability that you would
consider acceptable for Mr. "M and Miss T to get married.
Place a check here if you think Mr. M and Miss T
should not marry, no matter what the probabilities.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the marriage would be
happy and successful.

The

chances are 7 in 10 that the marriage would be
happy and successful.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the marriage would be
-happy and successful.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the marriage would be
happy and successful.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the mar'riage would be
happy and successful.
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